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The traditional social welfare state has addressed the problem of  poverty using an assort-
ment of  policy instruments.  These policy instruments have included: tax expenditure, con-
tributions, grants, income support, redistribution through employment insurance and the 
Canada Pension Plan (Les Pal, personal communication, April 3rd, 2008).  Asset-based so-
cial policy has been described as a new tool to add to an array of  existing tools that are used 
in the effort to fix the problem of  poverty. While proponents are not advocating that an 
asset-based approach should replace traditional social policy, they have injected new think-
ing into the social policy debate that challenges the effectiveness of  the traditional ap-
proaches because traditional approaches by themselves have not reduced the level of  pov-
erty.  This paper will examine what is different about an asset-based approach to social pol-
icy with respect to traditional policy instruments that have been used to alleviate poverty. 
What is asset-based social policy?
An excellent description of  asset based social policies (ABSP) in addressing poverty can be 
found in the Social and Enterprise Development Innovations (SEDI) web site.  SEDI de-
scribes asset-based social policy as:
	 "...a new progressive approach to the alleviation of  poverty and to fostering 	
	 independence.  Provides low-income individuals with tangible incentives to save 
	 their way out of  poverty by helping them build the kinds of  assets that can 	
	 transform their lives, through continuing education, skills training, self-	
	 employment or housing.  The thinking behind asset building initiatives rest in 	
	 the observation, that traditional income security programs are inadequate as an 
	 independent solution.  The asset building movement takes income security one 	
	 step further.  By not only offering a financial incentive, but also a combination 	
	 of  services, including financial literacy and case management, asset-based ap-	
	 proaches are designed to teach people how to make more productive use of  	
	 their assets" (SETI, 2008).
The tangible incentives used to help low-income people save their way out of  poverty in-
volve a number of  forms that provide an inducement for welfare recipients or low wage 
earners to save their money.  While there are different mechanisms, a common theme is 
present. Here is how it works.  A savings account or individual development account (IDA) is 
set up for a low-income person and for each dollar they save there is a saving credit received 
at a set saving ratio for a set period of  time.  For example, a person could save $1 and it is 
matched at 3:1 so the $1 they started with becomes $4.  As a result, a low-income earner is 
provided with an opportunity to build savings they could not do on their own (SETI, 2008). 
The opportunity to build savings and, hence, build assets is what makes asset-based social 
policies different from traditional approaches to social policy.
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Asset-based policies are not new. According to Jackson (2004), traditional government policy instruments involved tax-based measures, 
which have actively supported and promoted financial asset accumulation for the middle class and the wealthy (p.2). For example, tradi-
tional vehicles to support financial asset accumulation for the middle class have been registered retirement saving plans (RRSPs), registered 
education saving plans (RESPs) and Canada Educational Savings Grants.  While low tax rates on dividends and capital gains promote asset 
accumulation for the wealthy (Jackson, 2004, p.4).  What is new about an asset-based approach to poverty is that government provides in-
centives for low-income individuals and families to save money for their future or they can receive matching government contributions for 
purchasing a home or acquiring a post-secondary education (Williams, 2004).
Since the poor have low incomes and use their income to subsist, they pay little or no taxes and they have almost no financial assets, 
which exclude them from participation in tax subsidies or other asset-building programs; their lack of  assets means a lack of  independence 
(Jackson, 2004, p.2).  Jackson (2004) summarizes some reasons why assets, especially financial assets are critical:
• "it is very important in giving people some control over their future;
• it gives the ability to take risks;
• it gives the ability to make significant purchases that lead to other opportunities such as a car;
• it gives the ability to withstand interruptions of  income or deal with sudden financial emergencies such as an urgent home repair;
• the poor in terms of  income, with no financial assets are left in extremely financially precarious situations" (p.3).
Williams (2004) agrees that it is the lack of  asset accumulation that inhibits people's ability to escape from poverty (p.2).  William (2004) 
supports an asset-based approach because it offers a rich way of  thinking about and acting on poverty, places an emphasis, not only on 
building financial assets but building human capital (p.2).  It represents a new approach that offers a hand-up over a hand-out and attempts 
to balance rights and personal responsibility.  In summary, an asset-based approach is the use of  social policies that comprise a number of  
experiments to promote asset accumulation savings or endowments for poor families, including both welfare recipients and the working 
poor (Jackson, 2004, p.1). 
Where did asset-based social policies come from?
Moser (2005) states that traditional welfare poverty-alleviation strategies have served as the social safety net (p.1).  These strategies have 
focused on income transfers and other provisions (ibid). Typically, traditional approaches have seen the problem of  poverty strictly in terms 
of  income or lack of  it (Williams, 2004, p.2). Thus, policy formulations that recognize the problem in this way tend to focus on policy in-
struments that involve redistributive income transfers.  Critics of  this type of  policy say such approaches do not acknowledge the real prob-
lem; a lack of  progress in reducing poverty because sustainable livelihoods are not created (Moser, 2005, p.5).  
For this reason the problem of  poverty has been re-conceptualized causing social policy to morph into a more encompassing frame-
work.  This new conceptualization of  poverty defines the problem more broadly and in a way that recognizes social exclusion as a part of  
the traditional understanding of  poverty.  Pal (2006) states that not only is the risk of  poverty seen as the lack of  income at a single point in 
time in a person's life, but rather in terms of  a persistent lack of  income and other resources that are needed to enable people to be involved 
in meaningful participation in the economy and in society (Pal, 2006, p.123.).  Moser (2005) describes the new approaches to poverty as 
'social protection poverty-reduction policies' because there is an altered focus from income and consumption to the critical role that assets 
and capabilities play in improving individual and household social and economic well-being. (p.1). According to Moser (2005), the impor-
tance of  sustainable livelihoods creates a focus on the importance of  asset building (p.1). Other commentators share this view that policy 
instruments must also emphasize building capacity by focusing on the social and economic development of  households (Sherraden, 2005, 
p.4).
Sherraden (2005) provides a good account of  how asset-based social policies have emerged in the latter part of  the twentieth century.  
He describes how the social policies of  the welfare state have undergone a major transition caused by ideological and political challenges 
(p.3).  These challenges to traditional social policy reject the notion of  guaranteed income as a social entitlement without a greater emphasis 
on personal responsibility (ibid).  Sherraden (2005) attributes the ontology of  this orientation to be rooted in a social philosophy that believes 
in the positive effects of  asset holding and assumes that a nation would be better off  if  asset holding is distributed as widely as possible 
(p.10).  In addition, Sherraden (2005) describes how the relationship between income and well-being has been taken for granted and un-
questioned (p.3).  Sherraden (2005) contends that income support policies, which are underpinned by the notion of  income-as-well being, 
do not work well because income transfers have not enable poor families to develop and get out of  poverty, and for this reason income sup-
port policies by themselves are unsatisfactory as public policy (p.4).  Sherraden (2005) asserts that alternative strategies to the problem of  
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poverty have moved away from the idea of  income or consumption-as-well-being toward Amantya Sen's notion of  increasing functioning or 
capability or "increasing the capacity of  people to attain what they have reason to value" (Sen in Sherraden, 2005, p.4).  Sherraden (2005) 
points out that a policy of  asset accumulation has been very popular public policy in the US with the wealthy and the middle class; there is 
consensus that the policies that encourage accumulation of  assets are good for everyone (p.3).  Proponents of  asset-based social policy be-
lieve that from a fairness perspective, low income earners should be not excluded from the benefits of  asset accumulation policies (Jackson, 
2004, p.3).  In addition to an equity rationale, Nares et al (2001) notes that ownership of  assets plays a critical role in motivations and be-
havior that support long-term well-being and that ownership of  assets may yield important effects beyond increased income but to a better 
capacity to meet one's own needs (p.4).   Sherraden (in Nares et al, 2001) describes benefits of  asset holding:
• "improves household stability;
• creates an orientation towards the future;
• stimulates the development of  human capital and other assets;
• enables focus and specialization;
• provides a foundation for risk-taking;
• increases personal efficacy;
• increases social influence;
• increases political participation;
• enhances the welfare of  dependents" (Nares, Robson-Haddow, Gosse, 2001, p.4).
The idea of  asset building for the poor was first explored in the United States.  In the early 1990s, Dr. Michael Sheridan, professor of  
social development and director of  the Center for Social Development, CSD, at Washington University in St. Louis, introduced the concept 
of  individual development accounts, subsidized savings accounts for the poor, wherein every dollar saved is matched (SETI, 2008).  There 
are a number of  rationales for an asset-based approach to social policy with specific policy goals attached, however, the notions that assets 
have positive effects and can create behavioral change and encourages self-sufficiency is an idea in 'good currency' that appears to be a 
strong source of  support for the asset-based perspective.
How are asset-based policies been implemented in Canada, the UK, and the US and in an International context?
Canada
During the 1990s, two community-based asset building IDA programs in Calgary and in Kitchener Waterloo proved successful by 
enabling low income earners to purchase their first homes (SEDI, 2008). Based on these early findings that resulted in greater savings 
among welfare recipients and others, this success interested Social Enterprise and Development Innovations (SEDI), a national charitable 
organization dedicated to assisting people who are struggling with financial difficulties. SEDI did further research in to asset building for the 
poor and developed a proposal, which received funding in the late 1990s from HRSDC , to begin a program called Learn$ave.  This pro-
gram aimed to involve approximately 4500 low income Canadians with individual development accounts (IDAs).  Participants had to com-
mit to saving $10 per month for minimum of  one year to a maximum of  three years before any withdrawal of  matched funds (SEDI, 2008).  
Generally, the matching ratio is 3:1 and up to $1500 saved and there are limited ways that matched funds can be used.  Uses must be for 
learning purposes, either adult education or for a micro-enterprise. Clients can receive financial training and individual case management 
but it is not a mandatory pre-condition.  The Learn$ave program is a partnership with a number of  organizations, SEDI is the lead agency 
that oversees the projects design, administration and operation, HRSDC, a federal government ministry, provides funding, SRDC, an inde-
pendent consultant, is responsible for research and evaluation of  the program (SRDC, 2008). There are partner financial institutions and a 
national network of  community groups, service providers and partners, whom SEDI works with to keep service delivery on a local basis. 
Currently, the Learn$ave demonstration has lasted 8 yrs and a report regarding early impacts of  the program was released in January 2008 
(SRDC, 2008). In addition, SEDI has, also, two other asset building programs they are developing for low-income Canadians: i) home$ave, 
a similar program to learn$Ave, that allows low-income Canadians access to matched funding incentives for purposes of  home-ownership; 
ii) independent living accounts (ILAs) for people living in transitional or supportive living arrangements to build precautionary savings or 
savings for first and last month's rent (SEDI, 2008).
United States
The OECD (2003) informs that in the United States IDAs were first put into practice in the 1990s and tested in the American dream 
demonstration (ADD) (p.20).  Launched in 1997 by the CSD and the Corporation for Enterprise Development (CFED), ADD ran 14 pro-
grams in the United States involving roughly 2500 accounts that allowed low-income Americans to save for education, micro-enterprise 
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capitalization, training and homeownership (p.21).  Asset-based building programs began in the early 1990s in the private sector on a small 
scale. There was a major increase in IDA programs with the influx of  non-profits agencies, NGOs and community groups who were funded 
exclusively by private foundations. Asset building programs have grown steadily with 500 community based programs and 20,000 account 
holders in 49 states (p.24). State governments work with sponsors in private programs, which have maintained a local community-based 
style of  service delivery. Saving periods are for 3 years and uses for matched funds include: home ownership, education or training and for 
small businesses but some programs have broader uses for matched funds that might involve retirement income, home repair, and purchase 
of  computer or automobiles.  American programs focus on the working poor, which involve mandatory pre-conditions such as learning to 
manage limited finances and receiving financial literacy education (p.24).  By 1998 there was legislation to help meet the vast and rapidly 
growing demand for IDAs in low-income communities. Another step towards establishing asset-based policy in the United States came with 
the introduction of  savings for working families act (SWFA) to the U.S. Senate in 2003 (p.25).  Federal and State legislation now supports on-
going IDA programs in more than 250 communities across the United States (www.idanetwork.org). The North American programs typi-
cally require some participation in financial education to receive the matching credits and there are restrictions on how funds can be used.  
In Canada and the US, the savings are generous for particular uses, such as education or training, or home repair / purchase (SEDI, 2003).
United Kingdom
According to OECD (2003) asset-building programs evolved differently in the United Kingdom then in the United States, where grass-
roots programs operated by local initiatives spread to other groups and to higher levels of  government (p.26). The development of  asset-
based social policies in the UK was a top down process that involved formal research and public consultation (26.).  As a result, asset-based 
policies were brought forward in a more coherent fashion and integrated into the UK government's approach to the welfare state and wel-
fare reform (p.26).  Some asset-based UK initiatives are: a child endowment fund called the Child Trust Fund (CTF) and Saving Gateway 
(SG), which is similar to an individual development account (IDA) in North America but with some important differences (p.27).  A SG 
account lasts for a maximum of  5 years with a matching ratio of  1:1 and eligibility to participate is not based on having savings but on the 
receipt of  income support benefits. In other words, participants needed to be registered with a government program as a prerequisite for 
participation. In North America, IDA programs generally do not deposit funding directly to account holders, instead, an account holder will 
apply to receive a portion or all of  the matching funds. The funds are transferred directly from the IDA program to the educational institu-
tion or to the vendor of  the product or the service being purchased (SEDI, 2004).  Where SG account holders receive a lump sum at the 
end of  the 18 month project period (OECD, 2003), IDA programs generally penalize withdrawals of  personal deposits from the IDA ac-
count by proportionally reducing the eligible matching funds while some do not permit any withdrawal of  personal funds.  With SG ac-
counts, personal funds can be withdrawn at any time and the total amount an account owner will receive is calculated on the highest ac-
count balance at anytime during the project (SEDI, 2004).  While the SG scheme in the UK has no such restrictions on uses of  funds, SGs 
are administered differently compared to North American IDAs, as well; they are designed to promote long term savings (SEDI, 2004).
The CTF is a saving vehicle that provides an account for all children at birth, into which the government will pay an endowment and 
then make subsequent top up payments at certain ages, with higher endowments available to lower income families (OECD, 2003).    Addi-
tional contributions from family and account holders can be made when they are older. The funds will accrue until the child turns 18 with 
no restriction on uses. The policy reflects a universal government commitment to ensuring all young adults start their life with financial 
assets upon which they can draw upon (OECD, 2003). The CTF provides an example of  the compromise between a universal approach to 
social policy favored in many European countries in contrast to a targeted approach favored in the US and Canada (SEDI, 2004).
According to SEDI (2004), the UK's universal child benefit system combined with the CTF is a model of  progressive universalism: "In 
this model, an attempt is made to achieve both horizontal equity objectives including stake holding and vertical equity objectives by design-
ing programs that provide some benefit to all citizens, but progressively more benefit to those who are more disadvantaged" ( p.4).
International Context
In OECD countries asset building programs are fundamentally geared so that generated savings are used for education and skills train-
ing (OECD, 2003).  According to the OECD (2003) asset-based programs are targeted to the poor or sometimes they are not (p.32). Some 
programs are experimental while others are part of  a more formal national government program. For example, in the Basque region of  
Spain an experimental program offers incentives for vocational training to low income women.  In the Netherlands, there are 3 experimen-
tal projects: (i) targets employees with low education levels; (ii) offers incentives for skill training in mechanical services; (iii) offers incentives 
to temporary employees of  the multimedia industry, where an employee receives points for hours worked, then can convert them into 
vouchers to finance further training (p.32).  In Sweden, an ILA (individual learning account) pilot project aimed at 15% of  the labour force, 
has a goal of  2 million accounts in 10 years. The program offers incentives through the tax system; tax credits are contingent on the uses of  
funds for individual learning and skills development (OECD, 2003).  
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	 Outside of  OECD countries, aside from microfinance in developing countries, there are a few non-OECD countries 
that have adopted asset-building schemes (OECD, 2003). The largest is in Singapore, through Singapore's Central Provident Fund (CPF) 
matching fund uses are less limited (p.33). Citizens can uses funds for things like: home ownership, insurance, hospitalization, retirement, 
investment in property or financial assets (OECD, 2003). A program for children reinforces savings behaviour, called Edusave, school kids 
receive annual deposits to match money they have saved. Children can use funds to defray supplementary education expenses. Singapore, 
also, has a Children's Development Co-Savings scheme similar to the UK's Child Trust Fund but has different intentions (p.33). The scheme 
employs two mechanisms: at the birth of  a child (i) parents receive 1:1 matching funds in CDAs up to $1000 for the second child and up to 
$2000 for the third child and (ii) cash gifts from the government a) $500 for the second child and $500 annually for up to $3000 -b) $500 for 
the third child and $500 annually up to $6000 (p.33). The intent is twofold, first, to raise the birth rate and second, to promote human capi-
tal development (OECD, 2003).  In Chinese Taipei, a Family Development Account (FDA) demonstration similar to the American Devel-
opment Demonstration (ADD) was initiated in 2000 with 100 accounts and a 1:1 matching ratio.  The program was administrated by the 
city government but funded by a private, for profit firm (Boshara in OECD, 2003, p.34).
Case Study #1:
Learning to save / saving to learn: Early Impacts of  the Learn Save Individual Development Accounts Project (2008), is a project that 
is still being evaluated, a report will be released in 2009 (SRDC, 2008).  The Learn$ave project is a research and demonstration project 
designed to test whether or not an IDA can help low-income earners save in order to acquire more education or begin a small business (p.1). 
The project was developed to target adults with low-income and low asset levels (p.2). There were 10 community based non-profits, urban 
and rural sites, across Canada. Evidence was drawn from 3 major sites in Halifax, Toronto and Vancouver, where program operation and 
experimental research design were identical and accounts were maintained in large financial institutions (p.2). Applicants were randomly 
assigned to one of  three research groups: learn$ave-only group receiving only matched credits; learn$ave-plus group receiving credits plus 
financial training and case management and a control group which received neither credits nor services. There were 3,584 participants who 
were called, a total of  2,583 participants responded to an 18 month survey - this represents a 72% response rate. The survey was supple-
mented from data collected by the Participant Management Information System (PMIS) on account savings and withdrawal activity over 18 
months (SRDC, 2008).  Some learn$ave (2008) project details are:
• each dollar save matched by $3 credit;
• saving over 3yr period;
• maximum savings - $250 / month and $1,500 over 3 years;
• $10 saving minimum per month for 12 separate months before they can claim matched credit;
• match credits can be used toward education or training or for purchases (up to $6000 available) and at least 25% of  purchase must 	
          come from participants own funds;
• credit claimed within four years of  enrollment date (p.1-7).
The early results of  the learn$ave (2008) demonstration showed that low-income adults can be encouraged to save in order to improve 
their human capital, but the additional financial management training has so far not made a difference in this regard. By month 18, both 
members of  the learn$ave 'only' group and learn$ave 'plus' had saved, on average, $679, that is 71% more than the control group, which 
did not have matched savings credits (p.4).  Note financial management training and case management services have played no role in in-
creasing savings activities (p.6). Both the matched savings credit in the financial management training aspects of  learn$ave had a beneficial 
effect on budgeting and financial goal setting. As a result of  learn$ave, participants were more likely to have a budget 49.2% versus 38.1% 
for the control group, 6% was attributed to matched savings credits, and 5.1% was attributed to financial management training and case 
management services (p.7).
From direct observation, learn$ave (2008) had a positive effect on participant's attitudes to education.  At this early stage of  the project 
learn$ave had a modest effect on participation in education and training, although there are indications that learn$ave may be encouraging 
pursuit of  more costly education (p.5).  Learn$ave participants have not yet demonstrated any program impacts with respect to business 
startup or employment (p.6).  Learn$save (2008) early impacts showed that:
• "low income Canadians can actively save for their education provided they are offered incentives to do so;
• showed that matched savings credits accounted for most of  the increase savings activity;
• financial management training case management services played a surprisingly limited role;
• savings did not come from reduced investment and other savings vehicles, or from increased borrowing, or from increased working 	
          hours;
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• program encouraged participants to delay consumption of  household goods, or to buy cheaper items to generate funds for their        	
           learn$ave accounts;
• budgeting and financial goal-setting also benefited from participation" (p.5-7).
Case Study #2:
The American Dream Demonstration (ADD) was evaluated to determine how individual development accounts (IDAs) impacted sav-
ings and asset accumulation for low-income individuals (Mills et al, 2003, p.ii). An individual development account program, part of  the 
ADD, occurred in Tulsa, Oklahoma in conjunction with the Community Action Project of  Tulsa County (CAPTC). The clients were low 
income residents of  that city. This program was a four-year demonstration.  Here are some program details:
• uses for funding: homeownership, small business, postsecondary education ,home repair, vehicle purchase, retirement;
• one-to-one matching rates are higher;
• $10 saving commitment per month for at least nine months each year;
• up to $750 maximum matched savings per year, one withdrawal for allowable uses;
• $2250 over three years was the maximum allowed savings;
• full uses of  accounts over three years could accumulate $6750 for a home purchase or equivalent to $2250 plus $4500;
• family income below 150% of  the federal poverty line;
• applicant was required to take 12 hours of  general financial education;
• plus, specific financial education related to the type of  purchase (Mills et al, 2003, p.ii-xii).
To obtain an unbiased estimate of  program effects, the Tulsa site, randomly assigned individuals to a treatment group, who were al-
lowed to participate or individuals were randomly assigned to a control group who were not allowed to participate. There were 1,103 pro-
gram eligible applicants with 537 randomly assigned to the treatment group and 566 randomly assigned to the control group.  The findings 
for the ADD (Mills et al, 2003) were:
• "85% of  the treatment group opened IDAs;
• 34% had at least one withdrawal;
• 53% did not have a withdrawal and close their account;
• 14% had ongoing accounts with positive balances" (p.ix).
• "39% of  the accounts with one withdrawal or more, had:
• savings on average were $1480 per participant:
• savings plus matched funding was on average $3431;
• 35% were used for home repair or improvement;
• 26% for used for home purchase;
• 17% for education training;
• 17% for retirement;
• 5% for small businesses" (p.x).
According to (Mills et al, 2003) there was a significant increase in a higher rate of  homeownership among the treatment group (p.v).  
The medium-term effects and short-term effects proved to be quite different, because after 18 months only one significant effect remained, 
which was debt repair amongst the baseline non-homeowner group (p.vii).  The evaluator indicates that these results suggest that for certain 
types of  asset accumulation supported by IDAs, including long-term major investments such as homeownership, a multi-year timeline ap-
pears to be necessary for program results to take hold (p.ix).  Some interpretations of  the ADD (Mills et al, 2003) are:
• "positive effects of  homeownership, concentrated in different groups;
• no significant effects were found on small business ownership;
• homeownership increased by 6.2% in the treatment group over the control group; particularly among African-American families, 	
          after 4 yrs;
• retirement savings for African-Americans increased 85%;
• educational attainment, a 35% proportional increase in participation in at least one educational course over a three-year period com	
         pared to the control group;
• positive effects in two targeted areas, either in, investment, homeownership, retirement savings and the value of  real assets for 	
          African-Americans" (p.vii).
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Analysis of  Asset-Based Social Policies
Given the support for asset-based social policies across the political spectrum, in the academic community and from the positive results 
from the ADD and learn$ave demonstrations, why are asset-based policies not more predominant?  According to Mendelson (2007) the 
number of  asset-based programs in OECD countries remains modest because there has been a lack of  rigorous analytical evaluations to 
determine if  asset-based policies do what proponents say they do (p.3).  According to Mendelson (2007), part of  the problem is that pro-
gram objectives are not clearly stated and do not reflect implicit objectives of  asset-based social policy (p.4).  Mendelson (2007) cites the 
objective of  asset-based social policies is to reduce poverty, yet the explicit objective is not to replace traditional social policy approaches, 
which critics claim have been ineffective in reducing poverty.  The implication created is that asset-based policies will improve the efficiency 
of  the traditional welfare state approach (p.4).  Thus, an implicit objective is produced; the need for future social benefit will be reduced and 
efficiency will be increased with asset-based policies.  According to Mendelson (2007) this rationale reveals a dissonance between explicit 
and implicit objectives in the ADD and learn$ave demonstrations.  The stated objective of  both projects appears to be general and explora-
tory and not concerned with efficiencies.  Both projects state vague objectives by describing their purpose; to determine the impact of  in-
centives on the saving behaviour for low-income earners.  This highlights why asset-based social policies are not more predominant: because 
a large scale policy initiative cannot be underpinned by an evidence-base. The case study projects do not evaluate efficiencies of  ASBP 
compared to traditional welfare state approaches, which reveals that ASBP is simply an idea in good currency.
Additionally, it appears that more questions should be asked. It seems pretty clear from the success of  asset accumulation policies, that 
large incentives offered to people, low-income earners or not, will induce savings. Simply put the poor just do not have excess disposable 
income to take advantage of  tax-subsidies.  Jackson (2004) indicates that more salient questions need to be answered about asset-based poli-
cies: (i) are asset-based programs cost-effective relative to other current public expenditures? and; (ii) if  so, what is the optimal mix of  tradi-
tional and asset-based policy instruments that reduces poverty?
To better reflect the objectives of  asset-based social policy, Mendelson (2007), provides a framework of  analysis (p.4). Here is a sum-
mary of  Mendelson's (2007) typology for analyzing asset-based income security program objectives:
• efficiency - most programs state that the goal is not to replace income support policies but why not? What are asset policies supposed 	
          to do?
• behavioural well-being -ownership of  asset supports behavioural changed;
• redistribution of  wealth - is suspect due to widening income inequity, particularly in the United States;
• fairness - because low income earners are less likely to own assets they are less likely to access assisted saving vehicles the same as the 	
          rest of  the population (p.3-7).
 A major critique about asset-based social policy in an efficiency context has been raised by Jackson (2004), who states there is no 
strong evidence from experiments to date that show that the induced benefits of  asset-based savings tend not to go beyond the benefits from 
cash transfers (p.3).  Mendelson (2007) states that, while the Tulsa program attracted some low-income households to take advantage of  
large incentives, the outcome does not quantify public or private benefits versus costs (p.24). The administrative costs of  the ADD was very 
large compared to funds paid out to participants, additionally, UK and Canadian IDA programs have not provided good data to determine 
cost effectiveness (Mendelson, 2007, p.20).  If  there is little evidence that asset-based policies are not cost effective compared to income 
transfers, are there better uses of  public expenditures to address the problem of  poverty?  Are there more efficient ways for the poor to ac-
cumulate assets?  
Jackson (2004) suggests the possibility that asset-based schemes could come at a higher cost compared to other direct measures that 
already serve to increase the human capital of  low-income persons or households (p.3).  Are higher rates of  return already being realized 
from efficient spending of  public funds?  Another critique raised by skeptics of  asset-based social policy point out that forcing the poor to 
save out of  very low-incomes might be perverse, and may come at the cost of  meeting basic consumption needs (Jackson, 2004, p.3).  This 
might explain why recruitment drives for learn$ave required a significant effort? 
Mendelson (2007) advocates for the need for redistribution of  wealth and he states that this reason is often used as a rationale for asset-
based policies due to growing income inequality (p.6).  Asset-based policies could be easily designed for this purpose; however redistribution 
of  income through tax-transfer policy is not popular where most asset-based programs are found: US, UK and Canada (p.6).  Mendelson 
(2007) suggests that asset-based social policies, like learn$ave, can be advocated for on the grounds that providing those with low-incomes 
with government assisted savings similar to middle and upper class Canadians is only fair (p.10).
 Lastly, Mendelson (2007) classifies Sherraden's list of  possible objectives of  asset-based programs as mainly subjective personal atti-
tudes and behaviour changes expected from improving well-being through the instrumentality of  asset holding (p.6). For real social policy 
reform, where the asset-based perspective can contribute is in permitting higher levels of  allowable assets in social allowance programs; 
programs like learn$ave and the US IDAs seem to fit this category (Mendelson,2007, p.5).
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Conclusion
While asset-based social policies are still being refined, they are not meant to replace traditional social policy instruments, and they are 
seen as complementary to income support policies.  Asset-based perspectives raise important questions about how the welfare state has ad-
dressed the issue of  poverty. The perspective challenges "the focus of  traditional poverty-alleviation strategies on income support as ineffec-
tive because they have not enabled the poor to actually escape from poverty and improve their economic and social status" (Connell, 2003, 
p.3). Connell (2003) describes how governments have commonly employed policies that have used the tax system in various ways to subsi-
dize or encourage asset accumulation, except that the poor have not benefitted from such policies (p.3).  The confluence of  policy instru-
ments that promote general savings in the population, with policy instruments that deal with poverty, discourages savings in the poor be-
cause some programs deny income support to low-income earners who might have minimal assets (Connell, 2003, p.3).  As a result, the 
poor lose income if  they save, which creates a disincentive for them to build assets.  Sherraden (in Connell, 2003) calls this a 'poverty trap' 
because the poor have a disincentive to save and to remain on public income support (Connell, 2003, p.3).  Consequently, the asset-based 
approach has caused a re-examination of  social welfare policy, the issue of  poverty and a shift in the public policy debate.
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